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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

.
--------------~-------------

NEVE-WELCH ENTERPRISES, INC.,
A Utah Corporation, dba NeveWelch Furniture & Appliance,

••

.•

Plaintiff-Respondent,:
Case No. 17071

vs.

••

UNITED BANK,
A Utah Corporation,

••
••

Defendant-Appellant~
------------~---~-----------

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent sued Appellant for stopping payment on a cashier's
check .issued to Respondent by Appellant.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya,
without a Jury on February 4, 1980.

The Court found in favor of

Respondent and after amendments thereto the final Judgment,
Conclusions of Law, and

Fin~ings

of Fact were signed April 9,
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1980.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment and a determination that as a matter of law, a bank under certain
circumstances, may stop payment on its cashier's check.
Respondent has cross appealed the. trial court's refusal to grant
damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tri-Power Electronics, hereafter Tri-Power began a liquidation sale on or about April 17, 1979 which was to run through
Neve-Welch (hereafter Respondent) attempting to
..
take advantage of the situation created by Tri~Power's financial

April

22, 1979.

·(·,

~~.'
.

~

..........

-

-....

difficulties arranged to sell its own merchandise at Tri-Power's
liquidation sale on Saturday and Sunday, April 21 & 22nd. (T.6,
line 23).

There was no segregation of merchandise (T.9, lines 11

seq) and the proceeds from the sale of Respondent's merchandise,
were co-mingled with those of Tri-Power's (T.9-13).
On Sunday night, April 22, 1979, Respondent's President,
George Welch told Lee Klein, President of Tri-Power, what amount
Tri-Power owed them for Respondent's merchandise sold at the
sale.

(T.11, lines 28-30).

Lee Klein told Welch to write up an

accounting and that payment by cashier's would be coming the
following morning (T.12, lines 4-7).
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On Monday morning, April 23, 1979, George Welch, appeared at
Tri-Power for payment.

Lee Klein telephoned United Bank,

hereafter Appellant, and spoke with Loren Urry, Senior
Vice-President of Appellant and asked Urry to issue a cashier's
check to Welch (T.14,15,16,51,52).
George Welch testified that he was unaware of what was said
by the bank officer over the phone (T.15, lines 4-5).

Lee Klein

testified that he told Mr. Urry that a sizeable deposit would be
made that morning (T.52, lines 6-11).

The apparent reason for

this assurance was that the Tri-Power account at the bank was in
overdraft at the close of business on April 20, Friday, and at
the opening of business on Monday the 23rd in the amount of
$5,778.58 (T.89-92). Lee Klein testified that he thought there
·.

!!'

-

-

was a balance in the account when he spoke to
lines 16-18).

'

M~.

Urry (T.52,

He also testified that he thought there had been a

deposit made on Saturday but that he had not made such deposit
(T.52, lines 24-25 and T.53, lines 3-8).

In any event, Lee Klein

gave no check or other instrument to George Welch to present to
Appellant to exchange for the cashier's check (T.45-46).
On the morning of April 23, 1979, shortly after the aforementioned telephone conversation between Mr. Urry and Mr. Klein,
George Welch picked up the cashier's check from Appellant and
gave nothing for its issuance.

The cashier's check was issued on

the oral assurances of Lee Klein that the deposits would be made.
An involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed the morning of
April 23, 1979 against Tri-Power and its assets seized including

-3-
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•

deposits prepared for deposit to Appellant (T.74, lines 1-7,

T.76, lines 23,24).
There is some confusion as to whether or not some deposits
were actually made.

Evidence was presented over the strenuous

objection of plaintiff's counsel that a number of checks which
went to make up the alleged deposit were not paid.
Exhibit D-17).

(T.77 and

At the close of business on Monday, April 23,

1979, Tri-Power's account was overdrawn in the amount of
$9,518.20.

At the close of business on April 30, 1979,

Tri-Power's account was in overdraft in the amount of $48,530.40
(T.92 and 93).

On April 25, 1979, Appellant stopped payment on its cashier's
check (T.18, .lines 26-30 and T.19, lines 1-20, and Exhibit P-2)
based on a failure of

consiQe~ation.

---..,

.. :--

Respondent commenced action against Appellant on the theory
that a bank may not stop payment on a cashier's check and is
strictly liable thereon and for damages to its business and
reputation.

The trial Court found in favor of the Respondent for

the face amount of the check only, plus interest.

The additional

damages sought for the lost profits and damages to reputation

were denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNITED BANK HAS A RIGHT TO STOP PAYMENT ON
ITS CASHIER'S CHECK WHEN IT IS ISSUED WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The major issue in this case is whether or not a bank is
strictly liable on a cashier's check or whether it can stop
payment under certain circumstances, including failure of
consideration.
The Respondent contends that a bank is strictly liable once
it issued a cashier's check regardless of the underlying
transactions.

The following excerpts from the trial transcript

are illustrative.

At T.72 beginning on line 4, the following

exchange took place:

MR. OLSEN:

We will offer Exhibit 20-D, Your Honor.

MR. Go WALL: We will object to this as lack of relevancy and materiality. Whatever negotiations or procedures
they may commonly have between themselves and Tri-Power, I
don't think are relevant as to what procedures were used when
Mr. Welch picked up the check. This is a transaction between
Mr. Welch and the bank, and they are issuing that to him and
it is not drawn at his requesi~or on his -account.
I, therefore, don't think it is relevant on that basis.
THE COURT:

What do you claim for it, Mr. Olsen?

MR. OLSEN: Only that it's the instrument by which the
cashier's check was issued.
THE COURT: I am not sure I understand what issue bears
on~-as far as this trial is concerned.
MR. OLSEN: It bears on the issue of why the cashier's
check was issued by telephone, rather than some instrument
having been brought in.
THE COURT: It may be admitted for whatever probative
value it may have. I am not quite sure I understand, but I
will let it in.
At T.77 beginning on line 21 and continuing over to T. 78,
the exchange continued:
MR. OLSEN: Is that a portion of the deposit, that exhibit and those two checks, of the deposit which was brought in
by Mr. Klein the first thing that morning?

-5-
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A.

(Mr. Urry)

Yes, it is.

Q.

Now, were those checks in fact paid?

MR. B. WALL: I will object, Your Honor. He issued the
cashier's check, if he relied upon those checks or whatever
the account, his testimony is that there were funds available
in the account.
THE COURT: Now, you are .taking the position that he has
to rely on-- If he issues the check, it's almost-MR. B. WALL: Strict liability. That is correct, Your
Honor, because it is up to him to certify that check as to
whether there are funds or not, and once he cuts loose that
check, he in effect certifies and represents that those funds
are on deposit with that bank.
THE COURT:

Well, it's not a certified check.

MR. B. WALL: But he in effect represents that the·funds
are available, and the only thing Mr. Welch would have had to
have done was walk to their window and cashed it and they
would have an obligation to honor it.
THE COURT:

It is a pity for Mr. Welch.

He didn't know-

~

·~

·-.........

MR. B. WALL: Yes, but I ·think the
same degree of responsibility.

la~

requires that

Finally, at T.89, counsel for Respondent again objected as
follows:
MR. B. WALL: "If Your Honor please, at this time, I
would like to interpose an objection to this line of
questioning.
Now, the only reason I made the indication I did earlier
about this very subject is the fact that the Court has entertained some conditional receipt of another exhibit. I am,
you know, concerned about that. I think for the record I
would like to interpose and do interpose an objection to the
relevancy of this continuing exhibit or anything to do with
the account from the standpoint of its balance, in taking
into account our theory of the case, they issued a cashier's
check and what the balance was on a given hour or date, I
fail to see the mater~ality of it.
THE COURT: Okay, I understand your theory, Mr. Wall, and
I am not sure that it is incorrect. It may be correct, but
on the chance that is isn't, I am going to hear this.
\.

~6-
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t

•

"

MR. B. WALL:

That's why I wanted to make the record on

This case is one of first impression in this jurisdiction and
other jurisdictions seem to split on the issue.

It has been held

by a number of courts that a bank issuing a cashier's check may

defend an action upon it on the ground that it was issued without
consideration or through mistake, or that it was obtained through
false representation.

10 Am.Jur •. 2d, .Banks §569.

In a very recent case, TPO, Inc. vs. Federal Deposit Inc.
Corp., 3rd Cir. N.J., (1973), 487 F2d 131, applying the New
Jersey U.C.C., the Court followed this general rule.

The Court

indicated that a bank was not absolutely obligated by U.C.C.
§4-303 to honor its own cashier's check when presented by a payee
who was not a holder in due course, and was allegedly a party to
a scheme to defraud the

bank,~but

-~

·was entitled under U.C.C.

§3-306 and §3-408 to present defenses that would be available on
a simple contract, including lack of consideration or fraud.
Other cases follow the above rule where the payee is not a
?

holder in due course.

Mid Central Towing Co.

v. National Bank

of Tulsa, 348 Pa2d 327 (Oklahoma, 1960), Dakota Transfer &
Storage Co. vs. Merchants National Bank, 86 N.W. 2d 639 (North
Dakota, 1957).
Appellant submits that it is completely within its rights to
stop payment on its cashier's check.

If the position of absolute

liability on the check contended for by Respondent were followed
to its logical extreme, the Respondent could recover even if it
had alone perpetrated the fraud on Appellant.
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One of the leading cases for the proposition of absolute
liability on a cashier's ·check is Wertz vs. Richardson, 495
S.W.2d 527 (Texas, 1973).

The Court in Wertz, supra, by a

four to three decision held that a cashier's check is accepted
for payment when issued.

The majority spoke in conclusionary

terms and appeared to use circular reasoning in reaching the
result it did.

The Court unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish

between a customers right to stop payment on a check and the
bank's right to stop payment on its cashier's check.
A cashier's check is nothing more than a check drawn by the
bank the same as any other check would be drawn by an ordinary
person.

The only real distinction is that a bank is a depository

for its own funds as well as those of other people.
.

reasoning used in the majoritf opiriion

'

of~Wertz~

The type of

supra, would

force a bank to deal in cash or deposit its own money in
another bank.
The dissent in the Wertz case, supra, written by Judge
Walker, is well reasoned and analytical.

Judge Walker begins by

distinguishing those cases where a remitter or third person,
purchases or acquires a cashier's check for a payee and later
tries to stop payment after transfer, as opposed to the situation
in this case.' Here, Respondent as payee dealt directly with the
Appellant and acquired the check directly from Appellant.
Respondent stressed at trial, that this was an obligation
between Appellant and Respondent.

~udge

Walker, in the Wertz

case continued:

-8-
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"No one is attempting to order another person not to
pay, and Respondent is not denying liability on the
check because it was requested to do so or because
of any claim or r.ight asserted by another person.
Respondent has repudiated its obligation to pay on the
ground that it has a legal defense to liability on the
check, and the question to be decided is whether the
asserted defense is good. In my opinion, it is not
correct to say that a bank can never legally refuse to
pay one of its cashier's checks. For example, a bank
from which a cashier's check has been procured by fraud
would certainly be entitled to set up the fraud and
defeat liability as long as the check remains in the
hands of the payee who perpetrated the fraud. The text
writers agree that a bank may properly refuse to pay its
cashier's check to the payee on the ground of failure of
consideration or fraud. 5B Michie, Banks and Banking,
§521 (Supp. 1972); 7 Zollman, Banks and Banking,
§§4694, 4695. 495 S.W. 2d 572 at 575." (Emphasis added)
Respondent took the cashier's check directly from Appellant.
This is not a case where Respondent has transferred the check to
an innocent third party.

Respondent was given timely notice of

the dishonor as well.
--.......... .

The question presented by this ·case is- simpl'y one of law and
policy as to whether or not a bank can stop payment on its
·cashier's check.

A bank's right to stop payment under these cir-

cumstances is supported by both the reason and policy set forth
in the foregoing legal authorities.
POINT II
RESPONDENT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE AS DEFINED IN u.c.A. §70A-3-302 BECAUSE
IT GAVE NO VALUE TO APPELLANT IN EXCHANGE FOR
THE CASHIER'S CHECK.
U.C.A.

§70A-3~302

(1953), as amended, provides:

"(l) A holder in due course is a holder who takes
the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith, and ·
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been

-9-
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dishonored or of any defense against or claim to
it on the part of any person."
70A-3-303, (1953), as amended, provides:
"A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has
been performed or that he acquires a security
interest in or a lien on the instrument otherwise
than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of
or as security for an antecedent claim against
any person whether or not the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it
or makes an irrevocable commitment to a third
person."
Respondent's agent, George Welch testified that he received
no check or negotiable instrument from Tri-Power and delivered
nothing to Appellant in exchange for the cashier's check.
line 30 and T.46, lines 1-6).

(T.45,

Therefore, under U.C.A.

§70A-3-303(c), Respondent could not be a holder in due course.
.·

.

~~,

.~

. -..........

'

With respect to U.C.A. §70A-3-303(a) official comment 3 to
U.C.C. 3-303 which is identical to the above cited Section of the
Utah Code provides:
"(a) resolves an apparent conflict between the original
Section 54 and first sentence of the original
Section 25, by requiring that the agreed consideration shall actually have been given. An
executory promise to give value is not itself
value, except as provided in paragraph (c). The
underlying reason of policy is that when the
purchaser learns of a defense against the instrument or of a defect in the title, he is not
required to enforce the instrument, but is free to
rescind the transaction for breach of the transfers
warranty. (§3-417). There is thus not the same
necessity for giving him the status of a holder in
due course, cutting off claims and defenses, as
where he is actually paid value. A common
illustration is the bank credit not drawn upon,
which can be and is revoked when a claim or defense
appears.:
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Official comment 6 to the same Section goes on to state:
"Paragraph (c) is new, but states generally recognized
exceptions to the rule and that an executory promise
is not value. A negotiable instrument is value
because it carries a possibility of a negotiation to
a holder in due course, after which the party who
gives it cannot refuse to pay. The same reasoning
applies to any irrevocable committment to the third
person such as a letter of credit issued when an
instrument is taken."
The cashier's check was issued on the oral assurances by Lee
Klein that the deposits would be made (T.52, line 6).
executory promise and does not qualify as value.

This is an

Respondent at

trial argued strenuously that the contract on the cashier's check
was between it and Appellant and that Tri-Power's involvement is
immaterial and irrelevant (T.72, lines 10-12).
Again following Respondent's position asserted at trial,
~·

"

---

_..,-

""\

.

U.C.A. §70A-3-303(b) does not furnish the· consideration either.
If Tri-Power allegedly owes money to Respondent and Respondent
argues the deposits made by Tri-Power are irrelevant, that the
balance in Tri-Power's account is immaterial and finally,
that this is a contract only between Respondent and Appellant,
then U.C.A. §70A-3-303 (b) is of little of no help to Respondent.
Even if Respondent chooses to rely on this sub-section (b),
close examination reveals its inapplicability.
illustrate this more

clearly~

A owes B money.

and gives A a check or promissory note.

An example may
C owes A money

A can transfer the note

he received from C to B in exchange for release of the antecedent
debt A owes B.

B in this case would qualify as a holder in due

course.
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•

In the present case, Tri-Power owed money to Neve-Welch.
Tri-Power also owed money to United Bank inasmuch as its account
was in overdraft status when this check was issued (T.89, lines

92-93).

Appellant tranferre? a cashier's check to Respondent

based on the oral assurances of Lee Klein.

The Respondent gave

neither value nor consideration to Appellant for the cashier's
check.

Appellant over the objections of Respondent intruduced

evidence that Tri-Power as well failed to give value or consideration for the cashier's check.

Appellant is under no obli-

gation to gratuitously assume the debt Tri-Power owes to the
Respondent.
Appellant submits that the interpretation of the meaning of
"value" in the statute is a question of law and that the trial
Court erred when it determined that Respondent gave value and
-:

,

~

----

that good and valuable consideration had been paid by the
Respondent in exchange for the cashier's check, when in fact
neither Respondent nor Tri-Power ever gave any consideration for
the cashier's check in question.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN REFUSING TO
AWARD DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO RESPONDENTS CREDIT
REPUTATION
Respondent has chosen to cross-appeal on the following
issues:
1.

Failure of the District Court to award damages for lost

profits to plaintiff's by virtue.of defendant's failure to honor
the cashier's check.
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2.

Failure of the District Court to award damages based on

defendant's intentional,· reckless and unwarranted refusal to
honor the cashier's check issued by it.

3.

Failure of the District Court to award damages for injury

and damage to plaintiff's credit reputation."
In the amendments to the findings of facts and conclusions of
law signed by Judge Sawaya on April 9th, 1980, it states, at
number 2(b):

"The plaintiff is not entitled damages in addition

to the amount of the check and the interest thereon, the basis
therefor being too speculative."
It is also a well settled legal principle that this Court
will affirm the decision of the trial Court when its determination is supported by substantial evidence.
.. ,

l!r

•..

Ranch Homes Inc •

'·

vs. Greater Park fill Corporation,·' 592 ··P.2d 620_. (Utah, 1979).
This Court will not upset the trial Court's determination unless
it is "clearly against the weight of the evidence".

Ream vs.

Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145 (Utah, 1978), Winter vs. Charles Anthony,

In.£!., 586 P2d 453 (Utah, 1978).
Respondent presented absoluetly no evidence of Appellant's
wilfulness or any malice in stopping payment of the check as is
required for punitive or exemplary damages.

Palombi vs. D & C

Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969).
Damages for lost profits and to business reputation are considered too speculative to base an award of damages on. Howarth
vs. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515. P.2d 442 (1973).
There was substantial evidence that Respondent was in finan-
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cial difficulty well before the stop payment on this check.

An

independent audit conducted by a national accounting firm at
Appellant's request revealed an almost consistant history of
operating losses which actually diminished after Appellant
stopped payment on the cashier's check in question (T.105-107) •
.

In addition,· funds to replace those represented by the stopped
cashier's check were placed back into Respondents cash flow in
less than thirty days(T.42,103, lines 13-25).
Appellant submits that the trial Court was well within its
discretion in refusing to award these damages and based on the
foregoing, this Court should not upset those findings.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was within its rights to stop payment on its
cashier's check.

Respondents theory of strict liability is com-

--practicalities.
_,,,,-

mercially unsound and not based on

Respondent does not qualify as a holder in due course because
it did not take the instrument for value and gave Appellant
nothing in exchange for the check.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
trial Court and determine as a matter of law that Appellant was
within its rights to stop payment based on failure of
consideration.
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DATED this 4th day of August, 1980.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

DON E. OLSEN
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorney at Law
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
I

hereby certify that on the 4th day of August,

1980, I caused two copies each of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to be deposited in the

United-~tates

~ail,

prepaid, and addressed to:

BRANT H. WALL
GREGORY B. WALL
WALL & WALL
500 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
Neve Welch Enterprises

DON E. OLSEN
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